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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION-EFFECT OF STATE CONVIC-
TION OF MINOR DRUG OFFENSE BY YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS-AVAILABILITY OF
RELIEF FROM MANDATORY DEPORTATION BASED ON STATE CERTIFICATE OF RE-
LIEF FROM DISABILITIES GRANTED AS A RESULT OF THE CONVICTION
Petitioner,' a 22-year-old nonimmigrant alien and graduate student,
pleaded guilty and was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the seventh degree2 in the New York City Criminal Court
after having been found in possession of hashish. Petitioner was sentenced
to a conditional discharge for one year, fined $100 and, at the same time,
granted a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities3 which provided that the
recipient should not suffer automatic forfeiture of any right or privilege as
a result of his conviction. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) commenced deportation proceedings and found that the state court
I Petitioner was Shaheen Rehman, a native and citizen of Pakistan, who had been author-
ized to remain in the United States as a nonimmigrant student.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.23 (McKinney Supp. 1975). Seventh degree possession of a con-
trolled substance, simple knowing possession, is the lowest grade drug offense in New York.
N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
§ 701. Certificate of relief from disabilities
1. A certificate of relief from disabilities may be granted as provided in this article
to relieve an eligible offender of any forfeiture or disability, or to remove any bar
to his employment, automatically imposed by law by reason of his conviction of the
crime or of the offense specified therein. Such certificate may be limited to one or
more enumerated forfeitures, disabilities or bars, or may relieve the eligible offender
of all forfeitures, disabilities and bars. Provided, however, that no such certificate
shall apply, or be construed so as to apply, to the right of such person to retain or
to be eligible for public office.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a conviction of a crime or of an
offense specified in a certificate of relief from disabilities shall not cause automatic
forfeiture of any license, permit, employment or franchise, including the right to
register for or vote at an election, or automatic forfeiture of any other right or
privilege, held by the eligible offender and covered by the certificate. Nor shall such
conviction be deemed to be a conviction within the meaning of any provision of law
that imposes, by reason of a conviction, a bar to any employment, a disability to
exercise any right or a disability to apply for or to receive any license, permit or
other authority or privilege, covered by the certificate.
3. A certificate of relief from disabilities shall not, however, in any way prevent
any judicial, administrative, licensing or other body, board or authority from rely-
ing upon the conviction specified therein as the basis for the exercise of its discre-
tionary power to suspend, revoke, refuse to issue or refuse to renew any license,
permit or other authority or privilege. The certificate is designed to ensure that a
recipient will not be subjected to automatic, indirect sanctions upon conviction
without regard to individual merits. The offender remains subject to discretionary
power of judicial and administrative authorities who may rely on the conviction as
a basis for their actions.
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conviction subjected petitioner to mandatory deportation., His appeal to
the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed, and an order of deporta-
tion was entered. Petitioner sought review of the deportation order claim-
ing that the Certificate of Relief from Disabilities would bar deportation
based on a conviction. Held, deportation order set aside. An offender will
not be held "convicted" for purposes of deportation under section
1251(a)(11) where state judicial relief from disabilities is clearly intended
to prevent mandatory deportation and full expungement if a federal con-
viction would have been available in an analogous federal case. Rehman
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976).
Federal attitude toward expungement of state convictions has histori-
cally been deferential. Prior to In re A.F.,5 state expungement statutes were
traditionally given effect by the Board of Immigration Appeals both as to
crimes of moral turpitude' and as to narcotics offenses.' However, in 1956
Congress amended section 1251(b) of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (hereinafter referred to as INA) to exclude deportation for narcotics
convictions, under section 1251(a)(11)1 from its provision that a pardon or
recommendation from the sentencing judge would bar deportation., This
1 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970). This section provides for mandatory deportation of an alien
who has been convicted of a violation of "any law or regulation relating to illicit possession
of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marijuana."
8 1. & N. Dec. 429 (1959).
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1970).
Id. § 1251(a)(11) (1970).
The meaning of the term "conviction" in § 1251(a)(11) is an issue of federal law; there-
fore, neither the name nor the deportation consequences which a state assigns to a particular
disposition is determinative of whether a defendant has been "convicted" for purposes of the
federal immigration statute. For an overview of what constitutes "convicted" within the
meaning of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, see 26 ALR Fed. 709 (1976).
In de la Cruz-Martinez v. INS, 404 F.2d 1198, (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955
(1968), the court stated that a federal action based on a state conviction cannot be controlled
by how the state subsequently treats the conviction. Deportation is independent of any
punishment that may or may not be imposed by a state. Congressional, rather than state,
intent is determinative in judicial interpretation of the term "conviction" in § 1251(a)(11).
Id. at 1200. See also, Gonzalez de Lara v. United States, 439 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (5th Cir.
1971); Kilios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1976).
8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) provides that:
The provision of subsection (a)(4) of this section respecting the deportation of an
alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply (1) in the case of any alien who
has subsequent to such conviction been granted a full and unconditional pardon
by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several
States, or (2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the
time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty days there-
after, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported,
due notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representa-
tives of the interested State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be
granted an opportunity to make representations in the matter. The provisions of
this subsection shall not apply in the case of any alien who is charged with being
deportable fiom the United States under subsection (a)(11) of this section.
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amendment was considered to be a clear statement of national policy
favoring deportation of aliens involved in narcotics traffic. 0 In considera-
tion of this stricter national policy, the Attorney General ruled in In Re
A. F." that expungement of narcotics convictions had no effect on deporta-
tion proceedings under section 1251(a)(11)." While this holding has gener-
ally become precedent for future deportation cases, 3 in In re Andrade the
INS propounded the view that the 1956 amendment did not necessarily
reflect a clear national policy concerning marijuana offenses because these
offenses were not expressly incorporated into section 1251(a)(11) until
1960.1'
In Mestre Morera v. INS 5 the court maintained that the congressional
policy favoring the rehabilitation of young offenders expressed in the
Youth Corrections Act" would be thwarted if a conviction under the Act
could be used as a basis for deportation." In accord with the strict con-
struction of deportation statutes against deportability, 5 to give a youthful
offender a second chance "free of all taint of conviction," the court resolved
the inconsistency by holding that an expungement under section 5021 of
the Youth Corrections Act was inoperative as to section 1251(a)(11).11 That
is, a conviction of marijuana possession which is expunged under the Fed-
eral Youth Corrections Act is not a "conviction" for deportation purposes.
The INS recognizes the high value of expungement under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act,20 and has granted the same status to state juvenile
and youth offender statutes.2' The present position of the INS is that the
Morera decision will apply to marijuana convictions of youth offenders
where the crime has been expunged under state laws similar to the ex-
pungement provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act.2 This position
Bronsztejn v. INS, 526 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1975); Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804
(9th Cir. 1965).
8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (1959).
2 Id. at 445.
Aberson, Deportation of Aliens for Criminal Convictions, 2 PEPPERDINE L.R. 52, 73-75.
"In re Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651 (B.I.A. 1974), app. at 653 (letter of U.S. Solicitor
General Bork).
15 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972).
18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970).
II 462 F.2d at 1032.
" Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1953).
" 462 F.2d at 1032.
In re Zingis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 621 (B.I.A. 1974).
21 In re Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651 (B.I.A. 1974). This action was a termination of
deportation proceedings and withdrawal of a deportation order against a youthful offender
whose conviction of a marijuana violation had been expunged under the California Youth
Authority Act. Andrade had previously been held subject to deportation by the Board of
Immigration Appeals; this decision was upheld by judicial review. However, when the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, the INS followed the recommendation of the Solicitor General
and reconsidered the case. The judgment was vacated and case remanded with directions to
dismiss the case as moot, Andrade-Gamiz v. INS, 416 U.S. 965 (1974).
22 Id.
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does not currently apply to offenses involving narcotic drugs other than
marijuana or to state expungement laws that do not have a federal counter-
part.23
Future development of the law in this area is unclear .2 The ambivalence
of public opinion as to marijuana use, congressional action designed to
reduce penalties and expunge first convictions of simple possession,2 and
judicial recognition of the harshness of deportation in such cases26 may lead
to the development of a requirement of "meaningful" conviction2 for de-
portation purloses, at least for youthful offenders.
In Kilios v. INS,28 the only other case to be decided since the Andrade
ruling, the First Circuit refused to extend the doctrine of Morera to state
expungement statutes of general applicability even though the defendant
in that case would not have been deportable had his expungement been
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. 29 One of the chief concerns of the
Kilios court was that the rule, if applied to state expungement statutes in
general,'3 would be plainly contrary to the congressional intent to narrowly
confine the reach of expungement in federal drug cases. However, the
application of the Kilios rationale would make for an even greater disparity
in state and federal treatment of youth offenders and would make deporta-
bility depend upon the fortuity of the existence of a state juvenile or youth
offender statute analogous to the Federal Youth Corrections Act. General
expungement statutes having the same effect when applied to youthful
offenders would not be recognized. This is particularly anomalous because
in the case of minor marijuana offenses which violate both state and fed-
eral laws, the federal law encourages the United States Attorney to forego
prosecution and surrender a juvenile to state authorities,"' reserving federal
prosecution for more serious offenses. The result would be that a youth
offender prosecuted federally and convicted of a serious marijuana offense
would not be deportable if the conviction were expunged, while one prose-
cuted in a state court and convicted of a trivial marijuana offense would
be deportable if his conviction were expunged under a generally applicable
23 Id.
21 The lack of a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court in Andrade has resulted in haphaz-
ard development of the law from circuit to circuit and allowed the INS to stand by its narrow
ruling in the case.
21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970).
ZS See, Lieggi v. INS, 389 F.Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.
1975); Van Dijk v. INS, 44 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1971).
21 This would be comparable to the developments requiring "meaningful" communist party
membership in order to deport a legally resident alien. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1951).
' 532 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1976).
Id. at 788.
Id.
31 1 U.S.C. § 5001 (1948).
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expungement statute, rather than a youth or juvenile offender act.2
The rationale employed by the court in Rehman33 will result in a more
uniform application of substantive federal law. The court formulated a
two-step process that does not depend upon the labels applied to the state
remedies; first, the court required that the available state judicial relief be
clearly intended to prevent mandatory deportation;34 second, full expunge-
ment of a federal conviction would have to be available in an analogous
case. 35 Clearly, this approach would allow a more equitable treatment of
youthful offenders whether their convictions were expunged under the Fed-
eral Youth Corrections Act, state youth or juvenile offender statutes, or
generally applicable state expungement statutes. These expungement
statutes were designed to erase totally a conviction and give the offender
a fresh start, free of all disabilities. There cannot be a more complete
deprivation of a second chance at this new beginning than deportation."
Although the approach of the Rehman court is basically sound, the
dissent 37 points out what may be a serious flaw in the evaluation of the New
York Certificate of Relief from Disabilities under the first part of the test.
It is highly questionable that "deportation . . .would be contrary to the
purposes. of New York law, '3 or that the relief was "clearly intended to
prevent mandatory deportation."40 In Da Grossa v. Goodman" the New
York court specifically stated that "the granting of a certificate of relief
from disabilities in no way eradicates or expunges the underlying convic-
tion. 4 2 The Da Grossa court emphasized that the statute was not designed
as a general erasure of the conviction, but as a relief from certain specific
disabilities imposed by New York law,43 principally those that bar employ-
ment, voting, and receipt of certain licenses and permits." Under the
Rehman test, the federal court would be bound by the state court's con-
struction of the statute. 5 If a strict construction were applied, the statute
would clearly not meet the first part of the court's test. The Second Circuit
apparently read the statute more broadly than the New York court, but if
viewed as an expansion of the purposes of the available relief, rather than
31 In re Andrade, 14 1. & N. Dec. 651 (B.I.A. 1974), at 658-59 (letter of U.S. Solicitor General
Bork).
3 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976).
1, Id. at 75.
35 Id.
31 Mestre Morera v. INS, 462 F.2d at 1032 (1st Cir. 1972).
31 544 F.2d at 77-78 (J. Mulligan, dissenting).
,x Id.
3' Id. at 73.
11 Id. at 75.
" 72 Misc. 2d 806, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
,2 339 N.Y.S. 2d at 505.
13 Id.
" N.Y. COaREC. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
,1 544 F.2d at 77.
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in terms of the execution of a specific intent to prevent deportation, the
result reached might be supportable. Because the purpose of the certificate
is to prevent reliance upon the conviction to impose certain specific liabili-
ties, those involving automatic forfeiture of rights with no regard to the
merits of the defendant or the severity of the offense, the underlying pur-
pose of the law would clearly be frustrated by mandatory deportation
based on the conviction. In the case of a youthful offender, this type of law
largely serves the same purpose of expungement as does the Federal Youth
Corrections Act.
The two step test of Rehman appears to be a valid and equitable means
of determining whether an expungement of a conviction of a minor drug
offense will be recognized for deportation purposes. Not only does the test
allow more uniform application of relief from deportation, but it also fur-
thers the congressional and state intent to deal more leniently with youth-
ful offenders that is patent in the Federal Youth Corrections Act and many
state juvenile and youth offender statutes. When the Rehman test is ap-
plied to generally applicable expungement statutes and certificates of re-
lief, however, the underlying purpose of the law becomes crucial and may
lead courts to "manufacture" legislative intent in cases that appear grossly
inequitable. Equally problematic is the determination of what legislative
intent is necessary. Is it enough that the state legislation intended to treat
youthful offenders more leniently, or must the statute have been intended
to preclude deportation? Is merely frustrating the underlying purpose of a
statute a sufficient basis for relief? This type of scrutiny would not be
necessary if the Rehman test were slightly modified to turn on the effect,
rather than the intent, of the state legislation. Strict scrutiny of state
legislative intent would not be necessary if the test were: (1) does the state
statute have the same general effect upon the youthful offender as the
Federal Youth Corrections Act, regardless of the title the state applies; and
(2) would full expungement of a federal conviction be available in an
analogous case?
This is the more tenable approach because it relies on the intent of
Congress. Because of the plenary power Congress exercises over aliens,46 it
is not at all clear that the scrutiny of state intent is relevant.' In light of
the power of Congress to regulate aliens and the congressional policy re-
flected in the Federal Youth Corrections Act, a judicial determination of
whether nonrecognition of the state relief would frustrate the purposes of
Congress is more appropriate than scrutiny of state legislative intent. The
modified test takes these factors into account.
Finally, this test would facilitate a more uniform application of congres-
sional policy against deportation of youthful offenders for minor drug viola-
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1971).
,7 544 F.2d at 77.
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tions. The purposes of the Federal Youth Corrections Act are clear, and
United States residency is far too precious a commodity to be subjected
to the vagaries of state law once Congress has manifested its intentions as
to the treatment of this group of aliens. The federal government is not
inextricably bound by any label a state attaches to its program of expunge-
ment or relief. Therefore, by using a test that relies on congressional intent
and the effect of a state statute, a court may give a more equitable and
uniform application to federal law.
Donna R. Christie
